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PRETRIAL PROCEDURES FOR INNOCENT PEOPLE: REFORMING BRADY
I.

INTRODUCTION

This symposium,1 Exonerating the Innocent: Pre-Trial Innocence Procedures, presents
an unusual and fascinating opportunity. The organizers of the symposium have
proposed that the current adjudication process be scrapped for a defendant who certifies
his innocence and waives all constitutional rights.2 For those of us who find that
proposal troubling, the symposium challenges us to ask what pretrial changes could be
made, short of an entirely new adjudication track, to protect the innocent defendant.
My choice is the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory information to
the defense. In 1963, in what was intended to be a landmark decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that the prosecution has a due process
obligation to provide favorable evidence to the defense when that evidence is material
to guilt or punishment.3 Over the ensuing forty-five years, it has become clear that
this constitutional doctrine is inadequate to protect the integrity of the criminal
process and certainly has failed to protect the innocent.4 These failures result from
f laws in the Brady doctrine itself: its reliance on an outcome-determinative
“materiality” standard, its abject inability to ensure that investigating agencies
disclose exculpatory information to prosecutors, and its lack of any meaningful time
requirements. In the absence of meaningful judicial guidance, many states have
enacted statutes addressing a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory
information;5 most federal jurisdictions have created similar court rules.6 Congress
also has enacted Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 16).7 The
language and content of all of these provisions, however, are extremely general, and
it has been almost universally acknowledged that these requirements have not resulted
in sufficient disclosure by prosecutors.8
At the same time, in the more than two decades since DNA testing revolutionized
our understanding of wrongful convictions, we have learned much about what causes
wrongful convictions in the first place.9 This knowledge has led to changes in
investigative techniques, such as recording confessions and using more reliable
1.

Symposium, Exonerating the Innocent: Pre-Trial Innocence Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 825 (2011–
12).

2.

See Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the Adversarial System, 41
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 547 (2008); Lewis M. Steel, Op-Ed., Building a Justice System, News &
Observer (Raleigh), Jan. 10, 2003, at A17.

3.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

4.

Many excellent scholars have addressed the inadequacies of Brady. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch
of Flaws, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1533 (2010); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland,
47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685 (2006).

5.

See infra note 69 and accompanying text.

6.

See infra note 69.

7.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; see infra note 115 and accompanying text.

8.

See generally Medwed, supra note 4; Gershman, supra note 4.

9.

For an example of an article discussing the causes of wrongful conviction, see Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523, 542–45 (2005).
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identification procedures.10 Curiously, however, as the organizers of this symposium
astutely recognized, this knowledge has not yet resulted in reforms of the pretrial
adjudicatory process. We persist in ignoring what we already know. This is most
obvious in our failure to reform pretrial prosecutorial disclosure obligations.
For example, we know that the nondisclosure of exculpatory information is a
major cause of wrongful convictions.11 We know that particular aspects of the
constitutional doctrine have caused this, especially the imposition of the outcomedeterminative test of materiality on a prosecutor’s decision whether to disclose.12 We
also know the precise kinds of suppressed information that result in wrongful
convictions, such as prior identifications by witnesses,13 tips relating to other
suspects,14 or leniency deals with witnesses.15 We know that, although the Supreme
Court has held prosecutors responsible for the consequences of suppression of
exculpatory evidence by investigatory agencies,16 there is yet no reliable mechanism
for prosecutors eager to comply with this requirement to compel or even monitor
such disclosure.17 Finally, we know that the U.S. public has less confidence in the
criminal justice system than in other parts of government.18 Nothing is more
destructive of confidence in the system than the discovery, after a wrongful conviction,
that evidence of the defendant’s innocence—or of someone else’s guilt—was actually
10.

See False Confessions & Mandatory Recording of Interrogations, Innocence Project, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/fix/False-Confessions.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); Eyewitness Identification,
Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited
Oct. 27, 2011).

11.

Government Misconduct, Innocence Project, http://w w w.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Goverment-Misconduct.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); see also James S. Liebman et al., Capital
Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1839 (2000).

12.

See discussion infra notes 43–59 and accompanying text.

13.

See Government Misconduct, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Government-Misconduct.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).

14.

Id.

15.

See, for example, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), discussed infra note 48 and accompanying
text.

16.

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (noting that a “prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police”).

17.

New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices,
31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 2023 (2010) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group on Best Practices]
(“Prosecutors are charged with effectuating disclosure obligations, and are hampered in doing so in a
complete and timely manner if they do not receive evidence and information that is gathered by and
known to police investigators. Hence, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement, and
the procedures for ensuring information flow between those actors, are central to the discovery practices
of a prosecutor’s office.” (footnote omitted)).

18.

The Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, State University of New York at
Albany, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 112 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire
eds., 31st ed. 2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/toc_2.html (using the statistics in
Table 2.10 to show Americans have less confidence in the criminal justice system than in the banking,
medical, public school, or television news).
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in the hands of the prosecution or the police. No theory of fairness and efficiency can
possibly justify this result.
Like Professor Robinson, therefore,19 I am concerned about the moral
accountability of the adjudicative process. Our process has not kept up with our
knowledge about wrongful convictions. There is something horrible when the system
not only convicts the wrong person but had the information it needed to get the right
person. Like Professor Liebman, 20 I am concerned that exonerations of innocent,
convicted individuals often reveal circumstantial evidence of the identity of the
perpetrator—evidence that was available to police from the beginning and did not
match the innocent defendant, but turns out to match the actual perpetrator. 21
Finally, like the Risingers, 22 I am concerned about the limited amount of information
that ever enters the adjudication process pretrial and join their effort to make the
investigative process more neutral as a way to yield more information that can be
subject to adversarial testing.
But I also uniquely view this issue from a comparative perspective. Many of my
proposals here are based on the discovery process in the United Kingdom, which,
although not perfect, formalizes the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose favorable
information and neutralizes the partisan investigation of a criminal case, which results
in feeding more information into the adversarial process. Such a system can serve to
substantially help the innocent. In addition, the awareness that we stand alone
internationally in the narrow view of fairness (or the naively expansive view of the
adversary system) with respect to our limited disclosure rules informs my views here.23
There is a better way. In this article, I propose that the prosecution’s obligation to
disclose exculpatory information to the defense be formalized by statute, court rule,
or internal protocol in ways that would reflect the current state of our knowledge of
and experience with both Brady and wrongful convictions. This would improve on
the current ineffective constitutional protection—and any existing statutory or rulebased regimes—in several ways. First, such a formalized regime would require
disclosure of all materials that are reasonably helpful to the defense. Second, unlike
the constitutional doctrine, which provides no reliable mechanism for monitoring
police disclosure to the prosecution, an accompanying schedule (or “checklist”) would
require specific categories of exculpatory information that the prosecution would
have to secure from the police or other investigative agency and then disclose to the
19.

Paul Robinson, Professor, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Remarks at the New York Law School Exonerating
the Innocent: Pre-Trial Innocence Procedures Symposium (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://nyls.
mediasite.com/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=e599c53a63144b1d837d50148d48a5c41d.

20. James S. Liebman, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., Remarks at the New York Law School Exonerating

the Innocent: Pre-Trial Innocence Procedures Symposium (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://nyls.
mediasite.com/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=18566e942c2248bab5097658c953b13e1d.
21.

Id.

22.

D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence is Different: Taking Innocence into Account in
Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 869, 886–90 (2011–12).

23.

Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New Reflections on White Queens,
Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 Ky. L.J. 211, 217, 274–75 (2005).
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defense. Third, the prosecution would be required to certify that it has used due
diligence to collect and disclose all of the required information. Fourth, unlike the
constitutional Brady rule, which requires the defendant to show materiality whenever
suppressed evidence is discovered post-conviction, if suppression of evidence required
on the checklist is discovered post-conviction, the burden of proof would shift and
the prosecution would be required to prove that the suppression was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. As to any other information, the defendant would continue to
bear the burden of showing materiality. Finally, there would be a public interest
declination exception and a process for the prosecution to apply for a protective order
where necessary to protect a witness or another investigation.
Several doctrinal strands and recent developments come together to support the
creation of this new disclosure scheme. First, in several other jurisprudential contexts,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the investigative stage of a criminal case is
not as adversarial as the trial stage. Thus, for example, the police enjoy only qualified
immunity for misconduct during an investigation, 24 and, of course, there is no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel until formal proceedings have begun because the
adversarial process has not yet commenced. 25 Requiring a less adversarial, more
collaborative disclosure process would be consistent with this treatment of the
24.

In several areas, the Court has recognized that the investigative stage of a case is different—and less
adversarial—than the adjudicative stage. This doctrine supports a less adversarial disclosure regime.
First, the Court has distinguished the investigatory stage from the adversarial stage in the area of
prosecutorial immunity. In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court held that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute
immunity from a civil suit for damages arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for knowingly presenting
perjured testimony. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Court explained that such immunity is quasi-judicial and
is based on the need to protect the judicial process. Id. at 424–27. However, the Court has not applied
that immunity to investigative actions. Police and other executive branch officials are only entitled to
qualified immunity based on misconduct during the investigatory stage of a case.
Significantly, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment,
would have held that only qualified immunity applies where information relevant to the defense is
“unconstitutionally withheld . . . from the court.” Id. at 433–34, 443 (White, J., concurring). That is, to
the extent that absolute immunity is designed to protect the judicial process by ensuring that all relevant
information is brought to the attention of the court, “[i]t would stand [this purpose] . . . on its head . . .
to apply it to a suit based on a claim that the prosecutor unconstitutionally withheld information from
the court.” Id. at 442–43. Indeed, recognizing only a qualified immunity might result in disclosure of
more evidence, but “this will hardly injure the judicial process.” Id. at 443. Lower courts have held that
suppression of exculpatory evidence is “beyond the scope of ‘duties constituting an integral part of the
judicial process’” and have accordingly refused to extend absolute immunity to those actions. Hilliard v.
Williams, 465 F.2d 1212, 1218 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Haaf v. Grams, 355 F. Supp. 542, 545 (D. Minn.
1973). Moreover, as Justice White recognized, unlike acts committed in the courtroom as part of the
presentation of a case, for which the judicial process has the remedy of reversal, “the judicial process has
no way to prevent or correct the constitutional violation of suppressing evidence” of which it usually will
be ignorant. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443–44 (White, J., concurring). Accordingly, it is important to use only
qualified immunity to deter such violations when they do surface.

25.

The Court has long recognized that the investigatory stage is not part of the adversary process by its
decision that no right to counsel exists before the judicial process has begun until the filing of formal
charges has occurred. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); see also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972) (noting that prior cases in which the Court found the right to counsel attached all
involved “points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”).
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investigative stage.26 Second, the Supreme Court has required that prosecutors ensure
that exculpatory evidence in the hands of the police is turned over and has assumed
prosecutors have the mechanisms to do so. 27 Yet Brady and its progeny offer no
method to accomplish this and naively ignore the realities that interfere with
enforcement of disclosure by investigative agencies.28 Third, the Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that the suppression of requested, potentially exculpatory
evidence generally is prejudicial.29 That presumption should apply here to create a
presumption of prejudice where requested or itemized exculpatory information is
suppressed. Fourth, several high-profile criminal cases have revealed substantial and
systemic suppression of exculpatory evidence and have focused judicial and public
attention on the problem. 30 Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized, in other
contexts, that the United States is part of an international community.31 The fact
that prosecutorial disclosure is more limited in the United States than in most other
criminal justice systems, and imposes “fewer demands for transparency and fair play
than in almost any other mature legal system” in the world,32 reinforces the notion
that the time has come when we should abandon that dubious distinction.
A second development is reflected in recent scholarly and professional reform
efforts that have focused on changing and formalizing the prosecutor’s Brady
obligations. Recent proposals, like the one presented here, would, among other
things, reform Brady by formalizing it in court rules and checklists that would make
the prosecutor’s obligations clearer, more transparent, and more realistic, and,
therefore, easier to implement and enforce.
Ultimately, Brady’s naive but necessary underlying assumption that prosecutors
and their investigators will be able to wear two hats has been demonstrably disproved
not only by experience but also by social science. Clear rules and expectations are
required. Recent proposals suggest that this is the required reform; several states and
26. For a fascinating and thorough discussion about the non-adversarial pre-charge role of the prosecutor,

see Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial
Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923 (1996).
27.

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (“[N]o one doubts that police investigators sometimes fail to
inform a prosecutor of all they know. But neither is there any serious doubt that ‘procedures and
regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor’s] burden and to insure communication of all
relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972))).

28. Report of the Working Group on Best Practices, supra note 17.
29. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“When the prosecutor receives a specific and

relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.”).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. W.R. Grace, 429

F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2006).
31.

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (observing that in the Eighth Amendment context, “[t]he
judgments of other nations and the international community are not dispositive . . . . But ‘the climate of
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment’ is also ‘not irrelevant.’”
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n. 22 (1982))).

32.

Cerruti, supra note 23, at 212.
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district courts have already moved in this direction, and it closely resembles the
process currently employed in the United Kingdom. We should have clear disclosure
rules that ensure greater fairness and reliability of the criminal process.
Part II of this article sets forth the reasons to reform and formalize Brady, including
the inadequacies of the current Constitutional, aspects of the common law regime, and
recent scholarly and professional reform efforts. Part III analyzes the United Kingdom’s
statutory disclosure process, on which several of my suggested reforms are based. Part
IV suggests a model for a formalized Brady disclosure regime. Appendices A, B, and
C to this article offer model checklists and disclosure provisions forming the basis
for thier reformed Brady regime.
II. REASONS TO REFORM BRADY

A. The Inadequacy of the Common Law Brady Doctrine
Much has been written about the lost promise of Brady and its failure to protect
a defendant’s right to fundamental fairness.33 There is no reason to restate what has
been so clearly and effectively documented and analyzed elsewhere. Brady promised
to make the adversary system “less like a sporting event and more like a search for
truth.”34 Theoretically, exculpatory evidence that might never have surfaced would
now be revealed and subjected to adversarial testing as part of a fair search for truth.
The prosecutor’s superior investigatory resources would now be used to level the
playing field in the criminal process. Many have concluded, however, as the courts
developed and refined the Brady doctrine, the protections afforded have been easily
and frequently evaded.35
The failings of Brady may be due, in part, to its uniqueness. It was and still is the
only rule of U.S. criminal procedure that imposes an affirmative duty of fairness on
the prosecutor.36 In addition, it was and still is the only area of constitutional criminal
procedure in which the fairness of a prosecutor’s pretrial decision is governed by an
outcome-determinative standard—a standard that uniquely (1) puts the burden on
the defendant to show that (2) the prosecutor’s pretrial decision was unfair in light of
what occurred at a subsequent trial.37 Moreover, the defendant’s burden of proof is
33.

See Medwed, supra note 4, at 1536–44; Gershman, supra note 4, at 685–89. For a recent and thorough
discussion of a specific case involving a massive failure to disclose, see Beth Brennan & Andrew KingRies, A Fall From Grace: United States v. W.R. Grace and the Need for Criminal Discovery Reform, 20
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 313 (2010).

34. Gershman, supra note 4, at 708 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event

or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 8 (1990)); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 Wash. U. L.Q. 279.
35.

See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrong ful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L.
Rev. 275, 278, 285 (2004) (analyzing the results of U.S. wrongful conviction studies); Gershman, supra
note 4, at 687–89; Gross et al., supra note 9, at 542; Liebman et al., supra note 11, at 1849 (stating that
prosecutorial or police suppression of evidence that the defendant is innocent or does not deserve the
death penalty accounted for nineteen percent of reversals in capital cases).

36. See Gershman, supra note 4, at 685–89.
37.

See discussion infra notes 45–59 and accompanying text.
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uniquely high: no Brady violation is established absent a “reasonable probability” that
the jury’s verdict would have been different had the information been disclosed.38
Further, Brady necessarily rests on a remarkable—and perhaps blind—faith in the
capacity of prosecutors, who are advocates, to subordinate their values, cognitive
biases, and competitive instincts to undertake the role of “minister of justice.”39 In a
truly schizophrenic role,40 prosecutors must sift through their own evidence for
weaknesses, identify whether those weaknesses are serious, and nevertheless continue
the prosecution regardless. In addition, by imputing police nondisclosure to the
prosecution, Brady assumes, again, perhaps blindly, that there are procedures by
which prosecutors can ensure the police disclose exculpatory information to them.41
Yet there are none, and Brady provides the prosecutors with neither a carrot nor a
stick to do so.42 Finally, unlike other prosecutorial misconduct, a failure to disclose,
as well as the information suppressed, remains hidden from judicial review both
when it occurs and forever after, absent some serendipitous discovery by an already
convicted—at that point probably unrepresented—defendant.43
Scholarly opinion seems to agree that Brady has floundered on the shoals of the
materiality requirement. When it was decided, Brady’s directive to disclose favorable
evidence that was material to guilt or punishment promised disclosure of a wide range
of favorable evidence that would be considered material.44 Thus, while Brady originally
38. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (“The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”).
39.

See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. (2011); Bennett L. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception
to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations, Amicus: Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 6–7 (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Gershman_Publish.pdf (“The prosecutor is at once
encouraged to be a zealous advocate charged with the responsibility of winning convictions against
people who break the law, but at the same time is encouraged to be a neutral minister of justice with the
duty to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence that might assist the defendant in obtaining an
acquittal. . . . Brady exemplifies a remarkable faith of the Supreme Court in the capacity of prosecutors
to subordinate their moral values, personal biases, and competitive instincts to the overriding objective
of the pursuit of truth in the service of justice.”); see also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291.

40. See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 Ind. L.J. 481, 486–98 (2009) (describing the

prosecutor’s dual role as advocate and minister of justice in the Brady context).
41.

See infra text accompanying notes 50–54.

42.

See infra text accompanying notes 85–92.

43.

See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 531, 537 (2007) (listing various ways previously suppressed evidence may be discovered, including
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, investigation by defendants and their families, discovery
in related cases, or simply by chance).

44. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Court suggested that its decision was merely an

extension of earlier decisions concerning a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial, such as Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), where the Court reversed a conviction based on knowing submission of
perjured testimony. The unifying theme of these cases is the recognition by the Court of the central role
played by the prosecutor in ensuring that an accused receives a fair trial. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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indicated that the prosecutor has an obligation to disclose “favorable” evidence,45 the
obligation is really to disclose only material “favorable” evidence, a much narrower
category of disclosure. While the Court’s original decision might have suggested that a
wide range of favorable evidence would be considered material, its subsequent treatment
of that issue makes clear that the definition of materiality is extremely narrow. In
United States v. Agurs,46 a homicide case in which the defendant claimed self-defense,
the defendant had not requested, and the government had not disclosed, clearly
exculpatory evidence that would have shown that the deceased had a history of
violence.47 The Court prescribed two different materiality tests, depending on whether
the defendant had requested the suppressed information, and found that the suppressed
evidence of the deceased’s violent history, which was not requested by the defense, was
not material. Later, in United States v. Bagley,48 the Court explicitly held that
“exculpatory evidence” includes impeachment evidence. In that case, the defense had
requested, but the prosecution had failed to disclose, prior agreements with government
witnesses by which they would be paid if the defendants were convicted. The Court
also revisited the issue of materiality in the request-no-request dichotomy and adopted
a unitary standard of materiality for all situations. Under this standard, evidence is
material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”49
Later, in Kyles v. Whitley,50 the Court explained that the materiality standard
does not require a defendant to prove that disclosure of the suppressed material would
have resulted in his acquittal. Instead, it requires a defendant to show that suppression
of the evidence caused him to not receive a fair trial, meaning that the trial did not
“result[] in a verdict worthy of confidence.”51
The Kyles decision is also important because it revealed another serious fault in
the Brady doctrine: the Court made clear that when exculpatory information is
withheld by the police, nondisclosure is imputed to the prosecutor even if he does not
know anything about it. The Kyles court based that conclusion on the assumption
45.

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .”).

46. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
47.

Id. at 100–01. Justice Stevens observed:
[T]here are situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the
defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request.
For though the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness
and vigor, he must always been faithful to his client’s overriding interest that “justice shall
be done.” He is the “servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.” This description of the prosecutor’s duty illuminates the
standard of materiality that governs his obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence.
Id. at 110 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).

48. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
49. Id. at 682.
50. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
51.

Id. at 434.
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that the prosecution had a system for ensuring that the police disclosed such
information to the prosecution. In Kyles, the Court reiterated that the
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police. But
whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation (whether,
that is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad faith), the prosecution’s
responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a
material level of importance is inescapable.52

In its brief, the State of Louisiana argued that because some of the concededly
suppressed evidence had not been disclosed by the police to the prosecutor until after
trial, the state “should not be held accountable . . . for evidence known only to police
investigators.”53 The Supreme Court flatly rejected this argument, holding that “the
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” The
Court also assumed that a prosecutor “has the means to discharge the government’s
Brady responsibility” by establishing “procedures and regulations” to ensure a flow of
“all relevant information” from the police to the prosecutor’s office.54
Finally, in Strickler v. Greene,55 the Court both took an extremely constricted
view of materiality and repeated its reliance on the unrealistic assumption that the
prosecutors had some sort of systematic access to exculpatory information in the
hands of the police. The Court reviewed a prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory
materials in police files, even though the prosecutor’s office had alleged its compliance
with an “open file” disclosure policy.56 In Strickler, the prosecutor had failed to
disclose a series of communications with its star witness, which were later found in
police files after the defendant’s conviction. The materials documented a course of
police-witness interactions through which the witness’s initial failure to even notice
the defendant or the crime changed into a dramatic and harrowing tale of certainty,
fear, and violence.57 Undisclosed police notes of interviews with the key identification
witness, and her undisclosed written messages to the police, showed that she initially
could not identify the victim or Strickler, and that her memory improved only after
several additional conversations with the police and the victim’s boyfriend.58
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the conviction upon finding that the undisclosed
evidence was not material.59
52.

Id. at 437–38 (citation omitted).

53.

Id. at 438.

54. Id. at 437–38.
55.

527 U.S. 263 (1999).

56. Id. at 276.
57.

Id. at 273–74.

58. Id. at 273–74, 274 n.9.
59.

Id. at 296.
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There is a second way in which the Court’s interpretation of the materiality
standard has interfered with the promise of Brady. “Materiality” is not merely an
extremely high harmless error test; it is also the standard by which the police and
prosecutor must judge, pretrial, whether to disclose.60 That is, the same outcomedeterminative standard governs whether a conviction should be reversed for failure to
disclose and whether the prosecutor or police are even required to disclose something
in the first, pretrial instance. This test requires the prosecution to “engage in a
bizarre kind of anticipatory hindsight review.”61 That review is rendered even more
difficult because prosecutors lack sufficient information to make the pretrial
prediction of posttrial materiality and because it requires both the police and then
the prosecution to overcome their own cognitive biases that lead them to arrest,
charge, and prosecute the defendant in the first place. Then, having identified those
weaknesses as material, this test requires prosecutors to nevertheless continue to
prosecute the case.62
Additionally, as noted by several scholars, Brady is severely restricted by the
Court’s treatment of the right as a trial right in a criminal justice system in which
ninety-five percent of criminal convictions are obtained by guilty pleas.63 In United
States v. Ruiz,64 the Court held that the prosecutor was not required to disclose
impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea. This limitation has itself been
exacerbated by the Court’s failure to establish any timeliness requirements, suggesting
that as long as prosecutors produce all material, exculpatory information at some
point before trial, they have met their due process obligations.65
Apart from these limitations, the judiciary’s permissive interpretation of the
prosecutor’s Brady obligation allows prosecutors to evade it, as decades of case law
establish they have.66 Indeed, apart from errors relating to incompetent counsel, the

60. This is the standard for judging a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, which also employs the “reasonable

probability” materiality standard. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
61.

Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1587, 1610 (2006); see also Burke, supra note 40, at 485.

62. See Medwed, supra note 4, at 1542.
63. This problem has existed for a long time. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and

Wrong ful Convictions, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 651 (2007); Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for
Preplea Disclosure, 90 Yale L.J. 1581 (1981).
64. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
65.

Id. at 633 (noting that the “added burden imposed upon the Government by requiring its provision [of
material exculpatory information] well in advance of trial (often before trial preparation begins) can be
serious, thereby significantly interfering with the administration of the plea-bargaining process”).

66. This history has been thoroughly documented by other scholars. See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to

Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 415
(2010) (“The government’s duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense under Brady v. Maryland
has become one of the most unenforced constitutional mandates in criminal law.”); Gershman, supra
note 39, at 10, 14–15 n.61.
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most frequent basis for wrongful convictions has been the suppression of exculpatory
evidence.67
Finally, as professional consensus has recognized,68 existing statutory or rulebased requirements reflect the same flaws as the current common law doctrine.69
67.

See, e.g., Eyewitness Misidentification, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).

68. See infra Part II.B.2–4.
69. In 2004, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) published a report to the Advisory Committee on Criminal

Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the treatment of Brady materials in U.S. courts.
Laural L. Hooper et al., Treatment of Brady v. Maryland Material in United States District and State
Courts’ Rules, Orders, and Policies, Fed. Jud. Center (October 2004), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/bradymat.pdf/$file/bradymat.pdf. At the request of the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules, the Federal Judicial Center updated that report in 2007. Laural Hooper
& Shelia Thorpe, Brady v. Maryland Material in the United States District Courts: Rules, Orders, and
Policies, Fed. Jud. Center (May 31, 2007) [hereinafter FJC Report], http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/bradyma2.pdf/$file/bradyma2.pdf. According to that report, thirty-seven of the ninetyfour federal districts have a relevant local rule, order, or procedure governing disclosure of Brady
material. Id. at 7. In defining the Brady obligation, nineteen of the thirty-seven districts use the term
“favorable to the defendant.” Id. at 8. Nine others refer to the material as Brady material and nine others
describe the material as evidence that is exculpatory. Id. Twenty-eight of the thirty-seven districts
mandate automatic disclosure, nine require a request, one requires the parties to address the issue in a
pretrial conference statement, and two presume the defendant has requested it unless the presumption is
overcome. Id. Federal district timetables vary significantly. The most common is “within 14 days of
arraignment,” but some districts require a response within five days of arraignment, “as soon as
reasonably possible,” or “before trial.” Id. As to the prosecutor’s obligation to seek exculpatory evidence
from investigators, thirteen districts have a specific due diligence requirement for prosecutors and two
have a certificate of compliance requirement. Id. Finally, nine districts have declination procedures for
specific types of information. Id. Detailed analysis and charts of the U.S. District Court Rules and
Policies are set forth at pages 9–21 of the FJC Report and the actual district court materials are collected
in Appendix B on pages 25–38 of the report. Sample orders addressing Brady disclosure are set forth in
the FJC’s Report’s Appendix C on pages 39–41.
The 2007 report did not update its earlier 2004 survey of state codification of Brady, but included
it as Appendix E to the FJC 2007 report. Id. at 49. The 2004 report indicated the following about state
codification of Brady. First, thirty-three of the fifty-one jurisdictions have rules or procedures that
codify the Brady rule. Id. at 50. Twenty-three of the thirty-three states define the material required to
be disclosed as “any material or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the
offense charged or would tend to reduce the accused’s punishment therefor.” Id. at 51. Ten others refer
to “exculpatory material.” Id. Although five other states use the term “favorable” in describing evidence
subject to disclosure, all of them limit this clause with a condition that it must be “material and relevant
to the issue of guilt or punishment.” Id. at 52. Twenty-six states use the terminology of Rule 16, requiring
evidence that is “material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense.” Id. at 52.
Thirteen states require mandatory disclosure, regardless of whether the defendant has made a
specific request. Id. at 54. Three of these states distinguish between information subject to mandatory
disclosure and other information that must be requested or ordered by the court. Id. at 55. Hawaii
requires disclosure of favorable evidence only in cases where the defendant is charged with a felony. Id.
Thirty-eight states require a defendant to request favorable information before the prosecution’s
obligation is triggered. Id. Ten states place an additional condition on the defense either to show that
the items are material to the preparation of the defense and that the request is reasonable or that there is
“good cause” for discovery of the information. Id.
All of the states require the disclosure of the types of information required by Rule 16, although
many require more. Florida, Minnesota, and North Carolina all have “open file” discovery statutes.
Other states have expanded their statutory disclosure obligations piecemeal by, for example, requiring
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Two recent, widely publicized cases—the prosecutions of Senator Ted Stevens70
in Alaska and of W. R. Grace in Montana71—may have brought new attention to the
issue.72 In Stevens, the trial court found that prosecutors had violated the court’s
explicit Brady orders by doctoring documents to redact exculpatory statements,
removing a witness from the jurisdiction upon learning the witness had exculpatory
information, failing to turn over clearly exculpatory and inconsistent prior statements,
and had lied repeatedly to the court about what they had done.73 Ultimately, the case
was dismissed.74 In Grace, the prosecution’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence
concerning its star witness (e-mails from the witness to the FBI agent that
demonstrated his “intense prosecutorial partnership with the Government and his
obsession with seeking revenge against” the defendants)75 led the court to (1) permit
the defense to cross-examine the witness a second time; (2) prohibit the government
from redirect; (3) instruct the jury that the witness was back on the stand because the
government had violated its legal obligations; (4) instruct the jury that the U.S.
Attorney’s office had violated its constitutional obligations, the orders of the court,
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (5) advise the jurors to examine
the witness’s testimony with great skepticism and caution.76 Ultimately, the case
ended in an acquittal.77 Although the court did not find that the prosecutors had
the disclosure of one or more of the following items: witness names and statements, all police reports, or
all statements relating to an identification. Id. at 52–54.
In terms of timing, twenty-eight states have specific time limits for disclosure, ranging anywhere
from within ten, twenty-five, or thirty days after arraignment to not later than thirty days prior to trial.
Id. at 56–58. Eighteen other states have non-specific, descriptive time requirements, such as “timely,”
“as soon as practicable,” within a reasonable time, and the like. Id. at 58–59. Generally the states
consider disclosure timely if it is “within a sufficient time for its effective use” in preparing a defense.
Five states have a due diligence obligation that requires submission of some type of certification of
compliance. Such a certification generally states that the prosecutor has exercised due diligence to locate
favorable evidence and that, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, all such information has been
disclosed. Id. at 59.
70. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-231, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125267 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009). For a

discussion of the Brady issues in the Stevens case, see Jones, supra note 66, at 415–22.
71.

See Brennan & King-Ries, supra note 33.

72. For other federal cases from the same period that involved failure to comply with disclosure obligations

and received media attention, see United States v. Zhenli Ye Gon, 287 F. App’x 113 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009), and United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp.
2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
73. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 4–6, United States v. Stevens, No. 08-231, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

125267 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009) (No. 374).
74.

Id. at 48. Several other federal judges also found that U.S. Attorneys committed prosecutorial
misconduct by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants. See Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d at
1322; United States v. Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (D. Mass. 2010); Jordan Weissmann, Prosecutors
in Kidnapping Case Rebuked Over Brady, BLT: The Blog of Legal Times (June 24, 2009, 2:04 PM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/prosecutors-in-kidnapping-case-rebuked-over-brady.html.

75. Brennan & King-Ries, supra note 33, at 349.
76. Id. at 321.
77.

Id.
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committed misconduct, it did conclude that they had violated their ethical duties. As
at least one commentator has noted, “[w]ith prosecutors [now] feeling the brunt of
the chasm between vague legal rules and lofty ethical obligations—both individually
and as representatives of the people—reform may finally be possible.” 78
B. Increasing Effectiveness, Encouraging Reform
1. Introduction
Against this overwhelming evidence of the failure of Brady’s constitutional
doctrine lies the promise of reform by formalizing an effective disclosure regime.
As demonstrated above, common law development in this area has left much to
be desired. The courts have not kept pace with the realities of wrongful convictions,
including the findings of various commissions and studies concerning the causes of
wrongful convictions, or with the increased opportunities for exonerations created by
technology.79 Nor have the current federal or state statutory provisions kept pace.
The propriety of formal, rule-based changes has recently been recognized on
several important scholarly and professional fronts. First, a substantial contribution to
the kinds of formalized changes that should take place was made by Cardozo Law
School’s New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?
symposium. The symposium, held in November 2009, brought together approximately
seventy-five participants—representatives from the profession, including prosecutor’s
offices, defense lawyers, judges, as well as legal academics, cognitive scientists, social
psychologists, and medical professionals—to discuss the realities of prosecutorial
disclosure and to suggest changes. Second, the American Bar Association (ABA) has
78. Id. at 322–23.
79. It may in fact be that issues surrounding wrongful convictions are particularly suitable to legislative

response. This has been demonstrated by the approach to reform in the area of post-conviction DNA
testing. In Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009), the
Supreme Court recognized the widespread legislative response to the need for postconviction DNA
testing and expressly refused to impose a constitutional standard on the issue. Id. at 2322 (“The elected
governments of the States are actively confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our criminal
justice systems . . . as well as the opportunities it affords. To suddenly constitutionalize this area would
short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered legislative response.”). In that context, the
legislatures did not wait for the courts to deal with the problem piecemeal.
As Osborne recognized, the adversary system places a limit on the extent to which a court can remedy
the deficiencies in current law. Common law development can only occur piecemeal since the court can
only address an issue when it is presented in a particular case. Systemic changes or revision of a complicated
set of principles is simply not possible. This is particularly true in criminal cases for two important reasons:
the widespread summary treatment of criminal appeals, in which no precedential law is established, and
the fact that more than 90% of cases result in guilty pleas. Id. at 2316 (“The dilemma is how to harness
DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of criminal
justice. That task belongs primarily to the legislature.”); id. at 2322 (“To suddenly constitutionalize this
area would short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered legislative response.”); see id. at 2323
(“Establishing a freestanding right to access DNA evidence for testing would force us to act as policymakers
. . . .”); see also Minutes of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, U.S. Courts
(Oct. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Minutes of Advisory Committee 2009], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf (suggesting that amendment of Rule 16 should
most appropriately be done by Congress, rather than by court rule).
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itself recently endorsed formalization of Brady. Third, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
(Manual) has undergone recent changes to its formal requirements.
2. The Cardozo Symposium and a Consensus for Disclosure Checklists
In 2009, Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky of Cardozo Law School convened a
symposium entitled New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What
Really Works? The stated goals of the symposium were to develop best practices to
increase the reliability of results in criminal cases and to “optimize effective training,
supervision, and control mechanisms for managing information within prosecutors’
offices.”80 The seventy-five participants were split into six Working Groups, each of
which addressed an aspect of the disclosure issue: obligations and practices, the
process, training and supervision, systems and culture, internal regulation, and
external regulation. Each group met for five hours and succeeded in reaching a
consensus among the disparate participants—prosecutors, defense counsel, judges,
and experts—on as many aspects of their subject as possible. The findings were
reproduced in the Cardozo Law Review.81
The results of the Working Group on obligations and practices are the most
relevant to this article. According to the report of that group, there was a consensus
that the materiality standard should be omitted and that prosecutors should disclose
“all evidence or information that they reasonably believe will be helpful to the defense
or that could lead to admissible evidence.”82 This should be a matter of law, but,
where not codified, should be reflected in internal policy.83 Second, to the extent that
disclosure obligations are codified, these laws “should ideally be clear and conducive
to ease of administration.”84 That is, participants expressed
a preference for the development of a detailed statutory framework—one that
streamlines discovery and makes explicit exactly what should be turned
over—even if the statute (or rule of procedure) does not establish, and perhaps
cannot be perfectly drafted to establish, the full limit of a prosecutor’s legal
duties.85

Specifically, the Working Group endorsed explicit rules to ensure the full flow of
information from the police to prosecutors and recommended that each jurisdiction
adopt formal policies and procedures to do so. As discussed above, the Working
Group agreed that the assumption that prosecutors can compel disclosure by the

80. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really

Works?, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1943, 1944 (2010).
81.

Report of the Working Group on Best Practices, supra note 17.

82. Id. at 1966.
83. Id. (“The idea was not that laws would necessarily codify this principle, but insofar as the law falls short,

prosecutors would give effect to this principle as a matter of internal policy.”).
84. Id. at 1971.
85. Id. at 1966.
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police is unrealistic.86 State and local police generally operate independently of
prosecutors’ offices, answer to different constituencies, and may work together over
the course of many different cases, making their relationship extremely complicated.87
A prosecutor’s access to exculpatory evidence depends on police cooperation in
recording, preserving, and revealing such evidence, and, despite Kyles’s clear mandate,
prosecutors—acting in good faith—normally lack the power to insist upon access to
exculpatory evidence known to the police.88
A consensus clearly emerged from the Cardozo symposium that Brady’s
constitutional doctrine has not been successfully applied to the realities of law
enforcement and that something both clearer and more realistic is required. First,
prosecutors have difficulty determining pretrial what can or will change the result of
86. See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons

from England, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1379, 1383 (2000). In contrast to the Court’s unrealistic assumption,
Fisher very realistically points out that the relationship between law enforcement and prosecutors is
“governed by informal practices about which little is known.” Id. Fisher states that an English-style
legislative solution would be the most direct and effective remedy, but expresses doubt as to whether the
“political will” needed to pass such legislation exists in the United States. Id. at 1385. Accordingly,
Fisher puts forth amendments to both the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA
Standards for the Prosecution Function that would “aim to reinforce the prosecutor’s responsibilities
under Brady and Kyles v. Whitley to obtain access to relevant information known to the police.” Id.
Specifically, Fisher proposes adding the following subparagraphs to Model Rule 3.8, and to Prosecution
Function Standards 3-2.7 and 3-3.11:
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
....
[Proposed] (c-1) make reasonable efforts to ensure that investigators, law enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal
case reveal to the prosecutor’s office all material and information that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the offense or sentence.
STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION
3-2.7. Relations with Police
....
[Proposed] (c) A prosecutor should become familiar with existing law enforcement recordkeeping practices in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.
[Proposed] (d) The prosecutor should encourage and assist law enforcement agencies to adopt a
uniform police report that will contain all information necessary for a successful prosecution
and for compliance with the prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable information to the defense.
3-3.11. Disclosure of Evidence by the Prosecutor
[Proposed] (a-1) A prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to ensure that all material and
information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or
which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused is provided by investigative personnel
to the prosecutor’s office.
Id. at 1424.
87.

Id. at 1382–83 (citing Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory
Evidence in Police Reports, 28 New Eng. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1993)).

88. Fisher, supra note 86, at 1384.
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a future trial, if they are trying in good faith to comply. Even if they did, such a
decision requires that they overcome well-recognized cognitive biases, cease being
advocates, and suddenly become objective about the merits of their own cases. 89
Second, the constitutional doctrine that imputes police suppression to prosecutors is
based on the Court’s naive and untested assumption that there is a way for prosecutors
to compel disclosure by the police—again, even if all parties are proceeding in good
faith.90 As a result, the doctrine has failed to ensure that the police reveal exculpatory
information to prosecutors in the first instance. In addition, the police have even less
of an idea of what needs to be disclosed than the prosecutors and have fewer
professional restraints on their cognitive biases.91 There is no doubt that “police
generally want to do a good job, and that . . . [they] tend to be rule driven.”92 As
such, “formal rules can help them in their efforts to do a good job.” 93
Accordingly, the Working Group reached a consensus that each jurisdiction
should use checklists to “ensure full and timely transfer of all relevant information
from police to prosecutors.”94 These checklists would be technology based, would be
provided by prosecutors to the police, and would require that all types of information
on the checklist be provided to the prosecutors.95
Significantly, the consensus of the Working Group was that “developing
constructive and productive relationships with law enforcement can be one of the most
difficult aspects of the prosecutor’s job.”96 Different cultures and distrust abound, with
perceived “gulf[s] in motivations and incentives.”97 The Working Group concluded that
checklists might make the relationship more productive.98 Police experts also thought
such formal rules would help the police.99 Indeed, it was noted that police are
comfortable working with checklists in other areas and work best with clear rules,
expectations, and training.100 In addition, the Working Group recommended that
police be involved in pretrial discovery conferences with the court, the idea being that
such involvement would increase police accountability to the courts and prosecutors,

89. See Gershman, supra note 39.
90. See supra note 27.
91.

Report of the Working Group on Best Practices, supra note 17, at 1975.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94. Id. at 1974.
95. Id. “Remarkably,” the Working Group noted, “such a straightforward data system is not available in

most prosecutors’ offices.” Id. at 2006.
96. Id. at 2023.
97.

Id. at 2024.

98. Id. at 1994.
99. Id. at 1975.
100. Id.
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and thus increase the likelihood of full cooperation and compliance by the police.101
The courts might also require prosecutors to provide certifications of compliance. The
group also recommended a variety of checklist requirements, including a checklist of
items disclosed and privileged items withheld.102
Interestingly, the recommendation of checklists “grew from several
considerations.”103 Apparently, in the medical field, risk management has shifted its
focus from prevention of individual errors to creating systems that provide support
for performing a job correctly, rather than using threats of punishment.104 Under this
theory, a formalized checklist can be a tool that helps police identify and transfer
required information.105 In addition, it is clear that police generally want to do a
good job and because police “tend to be rule driven, formal rules can help them in
their efforts to do a good job.”106 Police are also accustomed to working with
checklists in other areas. Third, since cognitive biases impede effective investigation
and disclosure, a checklist would counteract such bias. Finally, some jurisdictions
have already begun using checklists.107
To be effective, checklists would ideally be filled out in real time, by a third party,
with audits of police compliance and perhaps mandatory police participation in pretrial
discovery conferences. If prosecutors determine that they have not received everything
they should, they would submit a formal request to police with the specific information
requested.108 The group suggested that an expert panel develop model checklists that
could then be tailored to meet particular, local needs.109 Finally, the Working Group
on internal regulations also recommended that prosecutors develop checklists that
“enumerate the categories or items of evidence to be disclosed in the course of a criminal
case, as well as other tasks associated with the discovery process.”110
101. Id. at 1978–79.
102. Id. at 2033.
103. Id. at 1974.
104. Id. at 1974–75.
105. Id. at 1975.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1976. For example, Prince George’s County, Maryland, uses a formal charging memo, which

“essentially serves as an information checklist.” Id. The Working Group noted that such a form could easily
be adapted to become the sort of checklist they envisioned. The Working Group also reported that in
Oregon, “a new paperless file system will allow scanning [and coding] of documents . . . to identify what kind
of records they are, and whether they have been disclosed to the defense.” Id. The Working Group noted that
this kind of electronic file management system “has the potential to facilitate creation and use of an electronic
checklist.” Id. Specifically, the Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney’s Office has implemented a
checklist system for major homicide cases whereby one person is responsible for maintaining a “Homicide
Major Crimes Discovery Assignment” form, which is “designed to ensure that job tasks, performance
standards, and due dates are all met on all matters related to discovery.” Id. The Working Group noted that
such an approach works well in big cases but acknowledged that it cannot be implemented in all cases. Id.
108. Id. at 1974.
109. Id. at 1977.
110. Id. at 2012.
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At the same time, the current police disclosure obligations fail to take account of
technological advances. The Working Group recognized that the most effective use of
checklists involves “real time” entries. Several participants noted that their document
management software could be used to include checklists of tasks, deadlines, and
confirmation of completion.111 Police disclosure could also be supported by giving the
police access to smart phones or netbooks that would simultaneously deliver information
to prosecutors. The standardized checklists and disclosure obligations discussed in
more detail below can be programmed into these devices.112
Finally, rules on timeliness that have not been developed judicially can more
appropriately be prescribed legislatively, as evidenced by many federal and state rules
governing timely disclosure.113 In those jurisdictions without such rules, timeliness can
be better assured by statutorily prescribed time limitations. If this is accomplished, more
information will be disclosed in time to render proceedings fairer and more reliable.
3. Organized Professional Reform Efforts
The organized bar has also recommended steps to formalize prosecutorial
disclosure. Currently, prosecutorial disclosure is governed in federal courts by Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.114 In 2003, the American College of
Trial Lawyers (ACTL) proposed amending Rule 16 by adding a new section that
would require disclosure within fourteen days of a request of “all information
favorable to the defendant,” without a requirement of materiality.115 The prosecutor
would be required to disclose all such information that “is known to the attorney(s)
for the government or to any government agent(s), law enforcement officers or others
who have acted as investigators from any federal, state, or local agencies who have
participated in either the investigation or prosecution of the events underlying the
crimes charged.”116 The proposed amendment also required due diligence by the
prosecutor in locating information and established deadlines for disclosure.117 The

111. Id. at 2021.
112. See infra Part IV.A–B.
113. See supra note 69; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (stating that the legislature is the

appropriate place for setting speedy-trial time periods).
114. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. Under Rule 16, the prosecution must disclose: (1) statements made by the

defendant; (2) the defendant’s prior criminal record; (3) documents and tangible objects within the
government’s possession that are material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense or are intended
for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the
defendant; (4) reports of examinations and tests that are material to the preparation of the defense; and
(5) written summaries of expert testimony that the government intends to use during its case in chief at
trial. Id.
115. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information Under Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 93, 111 (2004).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Department of Justice (DOJ) opposed the recommendation on the grounds that no
codification was warranted.
However, following the ACTL’s recommendation, the ABA’s Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules began to explore the question of amending Rule 16
to further codify and expand the government’s disclosure obligation. The DOJ
continually opposed any amendment, and, as an alternative to amending Rule 16,
revised the text of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual regarding disclosure. In 2006, the
Advisory Committee met to determine whether to forward the draft Rule 16
amendment to the Standing Committee for publication or to rely on the DOJ’s
revision of the Manual. Ultimately, the Committee voted 8–4 to forward the
amendment to the Standing Committee.118 The Standing Committee deferred
consideration of the amendment.119
Most recently, in February 2010, the ABA’s House of Delegates passed Report
102D, Judicial Role in Avoiding Wrong ful Convictions, in which it urged all U.S. courts
to adopt a procedure disseminating “to the prosecution and defense a written checklist
delineating in detail the general disclosure obligations of the prosecution under . . .
[Brady] and its progeny and applicable ethical standards.”120 It was further resolved
that all courts should create a standing committee of local prosecutors and defense
attorneys “to assist the court in formulating and updating the written checklist
delineating in detail the prosecution’s general disclosure obligations.”121 Finally, “any
omissions or deficiencies in the written checklist” should not relieve either party “of
their legal and ethical responsibilities with respect to providing and seeking
disclosures.”122 This set of resolutions is part of the ABA’s study “of how the judiciary
may minimize the danger of wrongful convictions.”123
118. FJC Report, supra note 69, at 6–7; see also Minutes of Advisory Committee 2009, supra note 79; Brennan

& King-Ries, supra note 33, at 330–31. The proposed amendment reads as follows:
Exculpatory or Impeaching Information. Upon a defendant’s request, the government
must make available all information that is known to the attorney for the government
or agents of law enforcement involved in the investigation of the case that is either
exculpatory or impeaching. The court may not order disclosure of impeachment
information earlier than 14 days before trial.
FJC Report, supra note 69, at Appendix A.
119. One of the two reasons given by the Standing Committee was that there were “questions whether a need

for the change had been sufficiently shown.” Minutes of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules, U.S. Courts (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Minutes/CR10-2007-min.pdf. The other reason was a concern that the government would be
required to disclose information that is not “material.” Id.
120. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Urges Changes to Criminal Trial Court Procedures, ABA Now, http://www.abanow.

org/2011/01/104a/ (adopting, as revised, Resolution 104A).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Am. Bar Ass’n Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Delegates: 102D (2010),

http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/themes/ABANow/wp-content/uploads/resolutionpdfs/MY2010/102D.pdf.
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The ABA has been active on another front: revising the ABA Prosecution and
Defense Function Standards, including the standards relating to prosecutorial
disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The proposed revision, which is still in the
drafting stages and thus not yet public, contains a broad definition of disclosable
evidence without reference to its materiality and directs that the prosecutor promptly
seek, identify, ensure the preservation of, and disclose such evidence.124 The 1993
standard only directed a prosecutor not to “intentionally fail” to make timely
disclosure of information, and it defined the scope of the information without
reference to impeachment (i.e., as evidence that would “negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigate the offense charged, or . . . reduce the punishment of the
accused”).125
The revision also addresses the prosecutor’s obligation to seek exculpatory
evidence from investigating agencies. In short, the revision includes a new subdivision
that directs the prosecutor to promptly advise other government agencies involved in
the case concerning their duties to identify, preserve, and share disclosable evidence,
as defined above, and to make reasonable efforts to discover such information.126
4. Revision of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
Finally, as noted above, in January 2010, the Department of Justice revised the
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual’s provisions on disclosure. In short, the revised Manual
requires prosecutors to disclose information “beyond that which is ‘material’ to
guilt.”127 It recognizes, however, that the trial should be limited to relevant and
significantly probative information and that evidence that is not significantly
probative should not be subject to disclosure.128 According to the revised Manual,
the prosecutor must also disclose, without regard to materiality: (1) information
“inconsistent with any element of any crime charged”;129 (2) information that
“establishes a recognized affirmative defense”;130 and (3) impeachment information
that “casts a substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any evidence . . . the prosecutor
intends to rely on to prove an element of any crime charged, or [that] might have a
significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence.”131 Unlike the Brady

124. ABA Task Force to Revise the Prosecution and Defense Function, Standards, Prosecution Function,

June 2010 draft (on file with author).
125. Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function § 3-3.11(a) (1993).
126. Id.
127. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-5.001(C) (1997) [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys’

Manual], http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/.
128. Id.
129. Id. § 9-5.001(C)(1)
130. Id.
131. Id. § 9-5.001(C)(2).
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doctrine, the Manual requires the disclosure of information, “regardless of whether
the information subject to disclosure would itself constitute admissible evidence.”132
In its comment section, the Manual refers the reader to Criminal Resource Manual
165, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery, which was itself updated in
January 2010.133 This Resource Manual is a Memorandum for Department Prosecutors
from Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden (Ogden Memorandum).134 Like the
Cardozo Law Review symposium report, the Ogden Memorandum is a consensus
document. Here, the consensus represents the conclusions of a working group of federal
prosecutors.135
The Ogden Memorandum divides the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation into
steps. Step 1: Gathering and Reviewing Discovery Information; Step 2: Conducting
the Review; Step 3: Making the Disclosures; and Step 4: Making a Record. First, in
relevant part, the Ogden Memorandum advises that the prosecutor “should be
granted access to the substantive case file and any other file or document the
prosecutor has reason to believe may contain discoverable information related to the
matter being prosecuted.”136 It continues by stating that “[g]enerally, all evidence and
information gathered during the investigation should be reviewed.” It also states that
where the potentially discoverable information is voluminous, prosecutors may satisfy
this obligation by disclosing the information to the defense.137 Finally, “substantive
case-related communications” that may contain discoverable information should be
maintained in a case file or otherwise preserved and reviewed carefully.138
As to Step 2, “Conducting the Review,” the Ogden Memorandum advises that
prosecutors may delegate the review of this material but that the disclosure
determination should not be delegated.139
In Step 3, “Making the Disclosures,” prosecutors are “encouraged to provide
discovery [that is] broader and more comprehensive than the discovery obligations”
132. Id. § 9-5.001(C)(3).
133. Id. § 9-5.001(F).
134. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding

Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Ogden Memorandum], http://www.justice.gov/dag/
discovery-guidance.html.
135. Ogden Memorandum, supra note 134. The memorandum explains that it was developed at Ogden’s

request “by a working group of experienced attorneys with expertise regarding criminal discovery issues
that included attorneys from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney’s Offices,
the Criminal Division, and the National Security Divisions” of the DOJ. Comments were also received
from the Office of the Attorney General, the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, the Criminal
Chiefs Working Group, the Appellate Chiefs Working Group, the Professional Responsibility Advisory
Office, and the Office of Professional Responsibility. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. For the purpose of this step, “‘[s]ubstantive’ communications include factual reports about

investigative activity, factual discussions of the relative merits of evidence, factual information obtained
during interviews or interactions with witnesses/victims, and factual issues relating to credibility.” Id.
139. Id.
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set forth in Brady, Giglio, and the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.140 Prosecutors are
cautioned not to describe this process as “open file” discovery, because that title can
be misleading. Disclosure should take place “reasonably promptly after discovery,”
with prior witness statements disclosed “at a reasonable time before trial to allow the
trial to proceed efficiently” but consistent, again, with countervailing considerations,
such as witness and national security.141
Finally, as to Step 4 “Making a Record,” the Ogden Memorandum stresses the
importance of keeping good records of when and how information is disclosed,
particularly in order to avoid time consuming disputes and to enable meaningful
responses to future claims of post-conviction relief.142
III. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STATUTORY DISCLOSURE SCHEME

The same evolutionary process that occurred in the United States occurred in the
United Kingdom. Until the 1980s, prosecutorial disclosure in the United Kingdom
was largely dictated by common law.143 Then, following a series of notorious
miscarriages of justice based on suppression of exculpatory evidence in cases arising
out of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism prosecutions, several major
reforms were enacted. 144 The U.K. government acted quickly: in the aftermath of
these cases, Parliament passed the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
(CPIA).145
Briefly, under the CPIA, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA),
the prosecution’s obligation is to disclose any “unused” material that “might reasonably
be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Mike Redmayne, Criminal Justice Act 2003: (1) Disclosure and its Discontents, 2004 Crim. L. Rev.

441, 441, 442. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the U.K. disclosure regime, see Lissa
Griffin, The Correction of Wrong ful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev.
1241, 1251–53 (2001), and Fisher, supra note 86.
144. Griffin, supra note 143; Fisher, supra note 86 at 1390–91.
145. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25 (U.K.). The CPIA’s disclosure provisions were

supplemented by the Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (U.K.). The major amendment was to omit the
distinction between a prosecutor’s primary and secondary disclosure duties and to enact, instead, an
initial duty to disclose that continues throughout the proceedings. The current, updated version is the
subject of this discussion.
The United Kingdom has not only codified its Brady provisions, unlike the U.S. Congress, but
also published several documents that detail what exactly must be done by the police and the prosecution
with respect to the disclosure of exculpatory material. See Crown Prosecution Serv., Disclosure
Manual (2005) [hereafter Disclosure Code], http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/disclosure_manual/;
Crown Prosecution Serv., Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure (2005) [hereinafter
AG’s Guidelines], http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/attorney_generals_guidelines_on_disclosure/;
Judiciary of England and Wales, Disclosure: A Protocol for the Control and Management
of Unused Material in the Crown Court [hereinafter Court of Appeals Protocol], http://www.
judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Protocols/crown_courts_disclosure.pdf.
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or of assisting the case for the accused.”146 This is an objective standard, replacing the
previous subjective standard that required disclosure of any unused material that, “in
the prosecutor’s opinion[,] might undermine” the prosecution’s case.147 The prosecutor
makes the disclosure determination based on two schedules that must be provided to
the prosecution by the police: a schedule of sensitive unused material and a schedule
of nonsensitive unused material.148 These schedules provide the prosecution with
access to the information in police files.
One important difference between the U.S. and U.K. disclosure regimes is that
there is a detailed statutory code of practice in the United Kingdom (the “Disclosure
Code” or the “Code”) that covers what must be disclosed, by whom, and when.149
This Disclosure Code is binding as a statute and is much more detailed and specific
than any other existing U.S. statute, court rule, or internal memoranda.150
A. Police Disclosure Obligations
Under the CPIA and the Disclosure Code, the police must
(1) take “all reasonable steps . . . for the purposes of the investigation,” and
investigators must “pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards
or away from the suspect.”151 Such an obligation may include making inquiries of
third parties or investigators in other investigations or prosecutions.152
(2) inform the prosecutor “as early as possible whether any material weakens the
case against the accused.”153
(3) “[r]ecord and retain” “all material” that “may be relevant to the investigation,”
i.e., information that appears to have “some bearing on any offence under investigation
or any person being investigated, or on the surrounding circumstances of the case,
unless it is incapable of having any impact on the case.”154 Appendix A to this article
contains a chart listing the kinds of unused materials that may be created. By U.S.
standards, the list is extensive.
146. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 3(1)(a) (U.K.).
147. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 32 (U.K.); Redmayne, supra note 143, at 442.
148. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, at ch. 6.
149. See generally Disclosure Code, supra note 145.
150. Compare Disclosure Code, supra note 145, with U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 127.
151. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶¶ 3.5, 4.2.
152. Id. ¶ 4.4. The provisions of the Code prescribe detailed steps that must be taken to obtain unused

evidence from third parties. Id. ¶¶ 4.4–.27.
153. Id. ¶ 2.2.
154. Id. ¶ 5.2. The importance of the retention and recording requirement is obvious; unless information is

retained and recorded, it cannot be revealed. See Fisher, supra note 86, at 1402, for his observation of
police training sessions on the duty to pursue, record and retain exculpatory evidence. Professor Fisher
attended several police disclosure training sessions and sets forth the participants’ experiences with, and
their recordings of, “negative” evidence, including contradictory witness accounts, failures to identify
the primary suspect, a retracted identification, confirmation of the defendant’s whereabouts at another
location, and incorrect preservation of real evidence that rendered it inadmissible. Id.
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(4) appoint an investigator, a disclosure officer, and an officer in charge of an
investigation disclosure officer,155 who must then list the retained materials on
schedules to be turned over to the prosecution; 156
(5) turn the schedules over to the prosecution, certify that all retained material
has been revealed, and give the prosecution access to all investigatory materials in
their possession.157
1. Retention
Paragraph 5 of the Disclosure Code also specifies what types of material should
routinely be retained. Again, by U.S. standards, the list is incredibly detailed and
extensive.158 And, when there is any doubt about the relevance of any material, the
investigator must retain it.
2. Scheduling (Checklists)
In addition, paragraph 6 of the Disclosure Code requires that the material be
listed on a schedule of non-sensitive material (Form MG6C)159 and a schedule of
sensitive material (Form MG6D).160 Sensitive material is material that the
investigating officer believes would not be in the public interest to disclose, including
national security information, information identifying police informants or the
location of surveillance, and material relating to children.161 All such material must
still be disclosed to the prosecutor with an explanation by the disclosure officer as to
why she believes disclosure would “give rise to a real risk of serious prejudice to an
important public interest.” 162 This schedule is not disclosed to the defense.163
The material on both schedules must be listed in sufficient detail for the
prosecutor to decide whether she needs to inspect the actual material before deciding
155. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶¶ 3.1–.5.
156. Id. ¶ 3.9.
157. Id. ¶¶ 3.9–.13.
158. The list includes: crime reports, custody records, records of any telephone calls, final versions of witness

statements and draft versions if they differ, interview records, communications between the police and
experts, information provided by an accused that indicates an explanation for the offense, any material
casting doubt on the reliability of a confession, any material casting doubt on the reliability of a witness,
and records of first description of a suspect by each potential witness who purports to identify or describe
the suspect, whether or not the description differs from that of subsequent descriptions by that or other
witnesses. Id. ¶¶ 5.1–.28.
159. Id. ¶ 6.4.
160. See infra Appendix A.
161. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶ 8.4.
162. Id. ¶ 8.2.
163. Id. ¶ 8.1. The disclosure of sensitive unused material is governed by detailed provisions in the Disclosure

Code in Chapters 8 and 9. Because this article addresses the disclosure of non-sensitive materials,
generally, those provisions will not be discussed at length.
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whether to disclose it to the defense.164 The disclosure officer must certify that “all
relevant material has been identified, considered and revealed to the prosecutor.”165
B. Prosecutorial Disclosure
Upon receipt of the police schedules, the prosecutor must review them and, if
there appears to be a mistake or omission, must seek additional disclosure from the
police.166 Disclosure to the defense, however, should not be delayed. If, following the
attempt to get further detail from the police, “the prosecutor remains dissatisfied
with the quality or content of the schedules, the matter must be raised with a senior
officer and persisted with if necessary.”167
After review, the prosecutor must disclose to the accused any material “which
might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution
against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused” (also known as “the
disclosure test”).168 This is an objective test.169 Under the Attorney General’s
Guidelines, the prosecutor must disclose anything “that tends to show a fact
inconsistent with the elements of the case that must be proved by the prosecution.”
This includes material that may be used on cross-examination, that might support a
motion to exclude evidence or a motion to dismiss, that might reveal that any public
authority has acted incompatibly with the accused’s rights, or that suggests “an
explanation or partial explanation of the accused’s actions.”170 Specifically enumerated
examples are any materials that: (1) cast doubt on the accuracy of any prosecution
evidence; (2) may point to another person, whether charged or not (including a
co-accused), as having involvement in the commission of the offence; (3) may cast
doubt on the reliability of a confession; (4) might go to the reliability of a prosecution
witness; (5) might support a defense that is either raised by the defense or apparent
from the prosecution papers; (6) may have a bearing on the admissibility of any

164. Id. ¶¶ 7.2–.5.
165. Id. ¶ 10.16. The certification set forth in the Disclosure Code reads as follows:

To the best of my knowledge and belief, all relevant material which has been retained
and made available to me has been inspected, viewed or listened to and revealed to the
prosecutor in accordance with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as
amended, the Code of Practice and the Attorney General’s Guidelines.
Id.
166. Id. ¶ 11.8. Section 11.6 also lists the documents a prosecutor should expect to receive from the police,

including “all material that the disclosure officer believes satisfies the disclosure test and a brief
explanation for that belief,” as well as the schedules, forms, and certification. Id. ¶ 11.6.
167. Id. ¶ 11.8. Records of any decisions, enquiries or requests and the date upon which they were made

should be kept on a “disclosure record sheet.” Id. ¶¶ 11.13–.14, Annex C.
168. Id. ¶ 11.3; Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 3(1)(a) (U.K.).
169. Redmayne, supra note 143, at 444.
170. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶ 12.8; AG’s Guidelines, supra note 145, ¶¶ 10–14.
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prosecution evidence; and (7) relate to the accused mental or physical health,
intellectual capacity, or ill treatment.171
The prosecutor’s disclosure decisions must be recorded on the schedule, which
must then be signed, dated, and sent to the defense.172
On the other hand, if a prosecutor believes that disclosure will compromise
national security or result in the destruction of evidence or harm to a victim or
witness, she may apply to the court for public interest immunity.173 Unlike the
prosecution’s disclosure duties, the principles relating to public interest immunity are
governed largely by common law.174 Information should be disclosed if it “may prove
the defendant’s innocence or avoid a miscarriage of justice,”175 but in reality the courts
employ a balancing test, weighing the public’s interest in nondisclosure against the
defendant’s need for the material.176 Depending on the nature of the evidence, the
court will also decide whether the defense should be informed of the application and
the type of material involved and given an opportunity to respond; whether the
defense should be informed of the hearing but with the hearing conducted ex parte;
or whether the defense should not be informed of the hearing at all.177 The latter,
entirely ex parte, procedure is rarely used.178
After the prosecution’s primary, or initial, disclosure, the defense has an obligation
to file a defense statement setting forth the nature of the defense, the matters on
which they take issue with the prosecution, and the reasons they do so. Details of
any particular defenses and points of law on which the defense will rely are also
required. The defense must also give names, addresses, and dates of birth of any
witnesses it intends to call and the names and addresses of any experts consulted,
whether they will be called at trial or not. “[U]nless the contrary is proved, defense
statements [are] deemed to have been given with the authority of the accused;”
therefore, a negative inference may be drawn against the accused if the defense at
trial includes something omitted or different from the contents of the defense
171. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶ 12.11. The prosecution is admonished to “borne in mind” that

although material viewed in isolation might not be considered capable of undermining the prosecution’s
case, “several items together [can] have that effect.” Id. ¶ 12.12.
172. Id. ¶¶ 12.18–.33, 12.36. In fact, the code goes so far as to prescribe specific initial abbreviations that

should be used, e.g., D, I, CND.
173. Detailed guidance about the standards and procedures for consideration of public interest immunity

applications are set forth in Chapter 13 of the Disclosure Code and by the House of Lords. Disclosure
Code, supra note 145, at ch. 13; R v. H & C, [2004] UKHL 3, [2004] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L.) [148] (appeal taken
from Eng.); R v. Davis, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 613 (Eng.). Again, the detailed procedures governing applications
for public interest immunity are beyond the scope of this article and will be only briefly described.
174. See R v. H & C, [2004] UKHL 3, [2004] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L.) [148] (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Keane,

[1994] 1 W.L.R. 746 (Eng.).
175. R v. Keane, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 746 [751–52] (Eng.).
176. Redmayne, supra note 143, at 458.
177. Detailed standards and rules governing these procedures are set forth in Chapter 13 of the Disclosure

Code. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, at ch. 13.
178. Redmayne, supra note 143, at 454–55.
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statement.179 The prosecutor has a continuing duty to provide unused evidence after
the defense statement is filed. The more detailed the defense statement, the greater
the prosecution’s burden to come forward with unused material that might aid the
defense.180
Thus, in several ways, the U.K. regime is likely to provide greater disclosure than
the U.S. scheme: first, it makes the police investigation relatively neutral by requiring
the police to record, retain, and reveal all relevant information; second, it structures
the communications between police investigators and the prosecutor (who now
knows what specific items they must obtain from the investigators before trial); and
third, it provides the defense access to the schedules of nonsensitive relevant material.
This is the system that gives prosecutors regular access to information that is in the
hands of the police—information the Kyles Court assumed prosecutors already had.181
And, in contrast to prevailing U.S. practices, the U.K. scheme does not rely
extensively on the good faith or discretion of the police and prosecutors, problematic
assumptions about their relationship, or naive and unrealistic estimations of their
ability to switch hats between advocate and minister of justice to find and reveal
potentially fatal weaknesses in their cases.182
IV. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE REGIME

The substance of a model Brady regime is set forth in Appendix B of this article.
Whether it be formalized in a statute, court rule, or internal directive, the prosecutor’s
obligation to disclose favorable evidence will not be meaningfully effective until it is
memorialized in a formal document of some kind. As demonstrated above, the
common law development of this constitutional obligation has not been successful.183
179. Id. at 446. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act’s provisions for the defense statement were

expanded by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. For a thorough discussion of the problems and objections to
the requirement of defense disclosure, see id. at 446–54.
180. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 37 (U.K.). This gets rid of the primary/secondary disclosure

distinction that was part of section 7 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act. See Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 7 (U.K.); see also Redmayne, supra note 143, at 444–45.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 50–54
182. See supra Part III.A–B.
183. The debate about whether to formalize or codify various aspects of the common law is centuries old and

has been expertly described elsewhere. See generally Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify—That Is
the Question: A Study of New York’s Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 641 (1992). As to
the prosecutor’s disclosure obligations in general, the debate has largely been resolved in favor of
codification. Thus, the prosecutor’s limited obligation to disclose inculpatory information is codified in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and in many state statutes. See supra note 69. The prosecutor’s
obligation to disclose exculpatory information is also generally set forth in the Federal Rules, and all states
and thirty-seven of the ninety-four U.S. district courts have already codified it, albeit in a general way.
What we propose here is to make the existing statutory or rule-based provisions more detailed and
explicit. This proposal is supported by the arguments in favor of codification generally—that it (1)
makes the law more accessible, clearer, and more effective; (2) permits reform; and (3) provides
uniformity. Opponents of codification generally argue that codification: (1) is unnecessary because the
common law system is working; (2) prevents development of the law; and (3) politicizes the law. See
Salken, supra, at 664–703. In short, it is clear that the existing ad hoc common law Brady regime is not
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A. A New Standard: Reasonably Helpful Information
The proposed disclosure statute would broaden the prosecutor’s obligation to
disclose from the current “material favorable evidence” requirement to a disclosure of
“reasonably helpful information.” The proposed standard is consistent with current
reform efforts. It will make the job of the police and prosecutors unquestionably
easier, remove the distorting effect of cognitive bias and the schizophrenic demands
of the current doctrine, and do away with the demands of 20/20 foresight. Police and
prosecutors do not have to abandon their law enforcement roles, overcome their
cognitive biases, or know the precise contours of the defense in order to determine
what might be viewed by an objective observer as “helpful.”
B. Checklists
A key provision of my proposal is the requirement that the police complete
disclosure checklists of what the United Kingdom calls “unused material,” and what
we would call “favorable information.” A copy of a proposed checklist is attached as
Appendix C. Given modern technology, these standardized checklists could be
maintained on computers or smart phones. Preferably, as recognized in nonlegal
contexts, a third party, such as a superior officer, would be responsible for making
sure these checklists are completed and for turning them over to the prosecutor in
charge of the case.
This checklist regime would finally provide conformity between the law and
reality by ensuring that, as Kyles assumes, prosecutors have a systematic way to
discover exculpatory information in the hands of the police. In addition, it will go far
to prevent undisclosed information from being hidden, only to be discovered
serendipitously after conviction. Suppressed information will no longer be hidden
from view, particularly if the checklists become part of the pretrial Brady conference
recommended by the ABA.
The ABA and the participants at the Cardozo symposium represent a professional
consensus that specific and detailed requirements—set forth in checklists—should
be developed to ensure appropriate disclosure. Certainly, as recommended by the
ABA, each jurisdiction could develop its own checklist. The proposed checklist in
Appendix C is offered to assist this effort. It is based on the current state of knowledge
about what sorts of suppressed information most frequently exist in wrongful
conviction cases. There is no reason to ignore this knowledge; indeed, judging by
recent reform efforts, there apparently is professional impatience to confront it.
Moreover, there is a professional consensus that we cannot continue to pretend that
the Kyles obligation can be satisfied by existing approaches.184
working and is not likely to be developed or reformed effectively in the courts. Moreover, a balancing of
the public’s interests against the defendant’s interest in fairness and accuracy is appropriately done by the
legislature, rather than by the courts.
184. Although several jurisdictions now follow an “open file” disclosure regime, that kind of disclosure is not

preferable to a checklist system for several reasons. First, “open file” disclosure still depends entirely on
whether the police chose to disclose information to the prosecution in the first instance. It does not
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C. Timing
Absent local rules or judicial decisions, there is no uniformity as to when defendants
receive exculpatory information, and there is currently no requirement that they even
receive it before entering a guilty plea. The ABA’s recommendation that the court
convene a pretrial discovery conference specifically addressing the prosecutor’s Brady
obligation should also address the timing of the conference. In the absence of such a
mandated conference, the proposed statute resolves the problem by requiring that
exculpatory information be disclosed within fourteen days of the defendant’s first
appearance or within fourteen days of a request, whichever comes first, with a
continuing disclosure obligation thereafter. Prosecutors would remain free to apply for
an extension or protective order under the public interest exception.185
There are, of course, other possibilities. One possibility is to require disclosure
“as soon as practicable.” Many existing statutes do that, but it is really a requirement
without teeth. Because disclosure of favorable information impacts a defendant’s plea
decisions and trial strategy, it is important that some specific deadline be imposed so
that information will be disclosed early in the process. Courts that have addressed
the timeliness question generally have reversed convictions where information was
not disclosed at a time when it could be used effectively at trial or at a plea

provide any mechanism for ensuring that disclosure. Panel Discussion, Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 781, 786–87 (1999) (commenting that “open file” discovery may not include
summaries of witness interviews or statements of witnesses whose safety needs to be protected). Second,
“[t]o the extent that an ‘open file’ policy represents to a defendant that a prosecutor has disclosed
everything in her file relevant to the case,” it can mislead defense counsel into believing that no
exculpatory information exists and will certainly lull counsel into “believing that he need take no further
action to enforce discovery requirements.” Gershman, supra note 43, at 544. Such evidence is commonly
omitted from disclosure by even the most well-intentioned prosecutors using “open file” policies.
However, Professor Gershman also sheds light on the potential for egregious misuse of “open file”
policies in his documentation of one of the “most notorious perpetrators” of this type of misconduct,
Carmen Marino, the former chief prosecutor in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Id. at 547. Marino’s unethical
use of an “open file” policy consisted of the following arrangement: defense counsel was taken into the
prosecutor’s office for the purpose of allowing “defense counsel to look at the file”; however, defense
counsel was not allowed to physically view police reports, which were read aloud to defense counsel by a
prosecutor. Id. at 547–48. Subsequent legal proceedings years later revealed that “critical Brady evidence
was hidden from the defense” through the use of this ploy “to lull the defense into believing it had
received a complete accounting of the prosecutor’s file.” Id. at 548. And, as Strickler v. Greene
demonstrates, through the pretense of transparency, prosecutors have the ability to withhold Brady
evidence from the defense. See 527 U.S. 263 (1999). Even those prosecutors who boast that they disclose
everything candidly acknowledge that much evidence is not disclosed under this policy. Among the
evidence that is not ordinarily disclosed are a prosecutor’s work product, summaries of interviews with
witnesses, notes and communications with other law enforcement officials, information that is privileged
or confidential, and information whose disclosure might threaten the safety of witnesses.
“Open file” discovery also may protect nondisclosure where a prosecutor claims to have
inadvertently slipped up. And some prosecutors use an “open file” discovery policy to overwhelm the
defense with massive amounts of documents, including potential Brady evidence, that are virtually
impossible to read and digest in the limited time available. See Gershman, supra note 43, at 542–46.
185. See infra Part IV.D.
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proceeding.186 The fourteen-day requirement would be most likely to result in
disclosure at a time when defense counsel can make use of the information.
D. Public Interest Immunity
Prosecutors know that other agencies withhold Brady evidence. Governmental
agencies involved in an investigation may decide not to disclose Brady evidence to the
prosecutor for several reasons, including a fear that disclosure may undermine the
safety of witnesses, compromise the integrity of the case, or damage other ongoing
investigations.
Under the proposed statute, the prosecution may apply for a protective order
limiting, deferring, or denying discovery if the prosecution can establish by clear and
convincing evidence that disclosure as contemplated will create an unacceptable risk
of (1) harm to a witness, (2) destruction of evidence, or (3) harm to an ongoing
investigation.187 The application shall be on notice to the defense. The category of
information for which an exception is sought must be given, although the specific
nature of the information need not be revealed.
E. The Burden of Proof
As has been demonstrated, one aspect of Brady that has contributed to its
ineffectiveness is the defense’s crippling burden of proving materiality. Under Brady,
the defense must show that there is a reasonable probability that the result would
have been different had the evidence been disclosed. We have already addressed the
problem of imposing an outcome-determinative test as a standard for judging a
pretrial disclosure decision. Assuming, however, that suppressed evidence does not
surface until after a conviction, how should appellate courts evaluate the fairness of
the resulting conviction?
The proposed statute would shift the burden of proving prejudice to the
prosecution in some cases, where it rests with respect to all other constitutional
violations.188 Specifically, with respect to the items required to be disclosed on
Checklist A,189 the disclosability of which the prosecution would have notice, the
prosecution would be required to show that nondisclosure was not material. With
respect to other items not required by Checklist A, the defense would continue to
bear the burden of proving materiality.
This modification of the prejudice requirement is supported by, albeit an extension
of, existing Supreme Court doctrine. As long ago as its decision in United States v.
186. See Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1107–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing timeliness issue and

reversing based on delayed disclosure); United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001).
187. See infra Appendix B.
188. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). For a list of constitutional errors that have been

subjected to the constitutional harmless error standard of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991).
189. See infra Appendix C.
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Agurs, the Court explicitly stated that “when the prosecutor receives a specific and
relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.”190
The checklist is a “request-equivalent.” For the same reasons that a specific discovery
request heightens the prosecutor’s burden, so should the checklist. Like a specific
request, the checklist makes the prosecution’s compliance much easier: it tells the
prosecutor precisely what to look for, rather than requiring her to comb through her
files and figure out on her own what might be disclosable. Like the request, because
most prosecutors who do not know what the defense’s strategy is, the checklist puts
the prosecutor on notice that certain information is important to the defense, so it is
fair to require the prosecution to prove that nondisclosure was harmless. Finally, as
the government suggested in Bagley, a more lenient materiality standard in a case
involving a specific defense request is appropriate because
an incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of
certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense that the
evidence does not exist. In reliance on this misleading representation, the
defense might abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.191

These factors argue in favor of a more lenient standard where material requested
in the checklist is not disclosed. By the same token, as to favorable information that
has not been requested or listed on Checklist A,192 the burden of proving materiality
should remain on the defense.
F. Defense Disclosure
The proposed statute does not reciprocally expand the defense’s disclosure
obligations. That is, beyond what already exists in state and federal statutes, there is
no requirement that the defense reveal its theory of defense or its witnesses, or
otherwise share information with the prosecution. This is unlike the regime in the
United Kingdom, where the defense has an obligation to file a defense statement that
identifies the defense’s theory and the ways in which the defense takes issue with the
prosecution’s contentions. In response, the prosecution must disclose any helpful
information that has not already been disclosed. Of course, the already existing U.S.
defense disclosure obligations concerning alibi and similar ambush-type defenses
will remain in place.
The statute does not expand the defense’s obligation because defense disclosure
has virtually no role to play in protecting the innocent and very little to do with
Brady’s fundamental fairness concerns. Brady was intended to level the playing field
by requiring that the prosecution reveal the results of its superior investigative
resources to the defense. While it is possible that defense disclosure will assist the
190. 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67 (1990) (articulating a higher standard of

materiality for specifically requested evidence under the New York State Constitution).
191. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
192. See infra Appendix C.
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prosecutors in doing so, the case law reveals that the exculpatory nature of information
routinely withheld by prosecutors is obvious, with or without any disclosure by the
defense. However, since this symposium’s proposed alternative process involves
increased disclosure obligations by the defense, one option would be to permit the
filing of a defense statement that would then broaden the prosecution’s disclosure
obligation in response. As in the United Kingdom, disclosure by the defense could
broaden the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation, but it is not a prerequisite to it. And,
as in the United Kingdom, once the defense statement is filed, the failure to disclose
information helpful to that defense would almost invariably require reversal.
V. CONCLUSION

The common law development of the Brady doctrine has not been successful in
protecting a defendant’s right to fundamental fairness, and case law demonstrates
that it certainly has not resulted in meaningful protection for the innocent. It is time
to acknowledge what we already know about the relationship between wrongful
convictions and the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Professional consensus
supports the codification of specific disclosure rules and requirements, such as those
set forth in the appendices attached: a broader disclosure obligation with no regard
to materiality, specific disclosure checklists and compliance protocols, a modified
materiality showing, and clearer and more effective time limits. At this stage of
scholarly, judicial, and professional awareness and development, a failure to design
and enforce such a clear and effective disclosure regime amounts to willful blindness,
and will perpetuate the current lack of faith in the morality of the criminal process
and its ability to protect the innocent.
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APPENDIX A
UNUSED MATERIAL THAT MAY BE CREATED OR USED DURING
AN INVESTIGATION
Crime Reporting and Suspect Identification
Form MG6C
999 voice tape
Exhibits not referred to in
statements
Post arrest photographs
Details of other suspects
arrested, interviewed,
or questioned but not
charged
Audio/video tapes of
interviews of witnesses
Potential witnesses’details
where no MG11 given
CCTV or other videos
Media releases by police
Fingerprint forms
Witness album
documentation
ID procedure forms
(except participant
lists)
Crime reports
Incident log of messages
Pocket books
Custody records
Letter of complaint of
crime
First description of all
suspects however and
wherever recorded
Material in police
possession from third
party
Plans or video of crime
scene
Details of whether any
witness has sought or
received a reward+

Form MG6D
CHIS report
Offender profiles
Port warnings
Wanted/missing
circulations
Crimestoppers
Force intelligence bureau
material
Sensitive material in
police possession from
Social Services or local
authority
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Administration
Form MG6B
Police misconduct
material (disciplinary
findings/convictions,
etc.)
Form MG6C
Road traffic crash reports
Vulnerable victim or
witness profile
Message Switching
System messages+
Record of property
recovered from crime
scenes
Record of searches
Custody record
Post charge photograph
Lay visitors report
Holmes actions, messages
and docs+
Family liaison logs+
Property recovered from
crime scenes forms+

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

Investigation

Forensic and Medical
Records

Third party

Form MG6C
Scientific or SOCO
findings not used as
evidence
Draft statements or
preparatory notes
DNA or other forensic
material not used as
evidence
MG11s from unwilling or
unhelpful witnesses
Prompt notes for
interviews
Medical Examiner reports
for suspect or witnesses
Records of information
provided, e.g., in
conversation
House to house
enquiries+
Audiotape or written note
of interview with
witnesses notified by
the accused

Form MG6C
SOCO/IDO work sheets
File records
Pathologists’ records
Dental records
Forensic scientist’s records
lab forms
Hospital records relating
to the condition which
is the subject of the
offence charged+

Form MG6
Medical and dental
records
Media material
Special procedure
applications
Records held by other
agencies
Form MG6D
Records/material held by
Social Services or local
authority

Form MG6D
Operational briefing/
debriefing sheets
Policy files
Information in support of
search or arrest
warrants
RIPA authorities/
documentation
Observations/surveillance
logs

+Enter on MG6C unless would reveal sensitive material in which case list on MG6D or consider editing.
Edit sensitive entries from copies to be disclosed to defence, e.g., address telephone numbers.
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APPENDIX B – MODEL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
The following provisions supplement existing disclosure obligations of the police and
prosecution.
I. Required Disclosure
Within fourteen days of a defendant’s request, and subject only to the public
interest immunity exception set forth in Part III, below, the prosecutor shall make
the following disclosure to the defense and to the court:
A. Any and all information that might reasonably be helpful to the defense, in
any form, that tends to (a) exculpate the defendant; (b) adversely impact the
credibility of government witnesses or evidence; (c) mitigate the offense; or
(d) mitigate punishment.
B. Checklist A, as indicated.
C. Such disclosure shall be accompanied by a written certification that the
prosecutor has exercised due diligence in locating all information favorable to
the defendant, that the prosecutor has disclosed such information, and that
the prosecutor acknowledges his continuing obligation to disclose such
information immediately upon such information becoming known.
D. If the prosecutor reasonably believes that the disclosure of certain information
will lead to the destruction of evidence or harm to any individual, that
information should be listed on a separate Checklist, titled Checklist B.
II. Failure to Disclose Listed Information
Where information of the type listed on Checklist A is not revealed to the
defense but is discovered and forms the basis of a defense request for post-conviction
relief, the prosecution shall be required to prove that the failure to disclose that
information was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Where information not
required to be disclosed on Checklist A is not revealed to the defense but is discovered
and forms the basis of a defense request for post-conviction relief, the defendant shall
be required to prove that the failure to disclose was material. As used in this statute,
“material” means there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been
different had the information been disclosed.
III. Public Interest Immunity
An application may be made to the court for a protective order where the
prosecutor can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that disclosure of the
information set forth in Section II, above, will result in:
(1) physical injury to any individual;
(2) the destruction or disappearance of relevant evidence; or
(3) irreparable damage to an ongoing investigation.
IV. Sanctions
Failure to comply with any of the obligations set forth in this statute may result in
dismissal, preclusion, default, or the imposition of other sanctions as deemed
appropriate by the court.
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APPENDIX C
CHECKLIST A: REQUIRED DISCLOSURE
As to Witnesses, generally
Relationship to defendant
Past criminal record
Prison records
Suspected criminal activity
Prior inconsistent statements
Prior conduct that suggests a motive to lie
Promises of leniency, written or unwritten
Reasonable expectations of leniency
Written agreements
Any of the witnesses originally suspects?
Reward offered?
Identification Witnesses
Any witness who identified the defendant?
What form of identification procedure?
Any previous descriptions?
Any witness who failed to identify the defendant?
Any witness who identified someone [other than the defendant]?
Any witness who expressed uncertainty in identifying the defendant?
Any witness who changed his or her mind about identification?
Forensic
Was a weapon recovered?
Any forensic testing?
Were the results conclusive?
Medical evidence?
Psychiatric reports
Informant
Tips
Promises of immunity
Prior criminal records
Prior inconsistent statements
Information about mental or physical impairment
Inconsistent or contradictory scientific tests
Pending charges
Monetary inducements
Proffers
Failure to institute civil proceedings
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Statements of eyewitnesses
Any and all statements of identifying witnesses
Any information relating to identification of other suspects
Prior inconsistent statements
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